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Constitutional Law-Fair Hearing-A Provider of Services Has
a Right to Challenge a Determination of Medicaid Benefits for
its Patients. Peninsula General Nursing Home v. Sugarman, 57
App. Div. 2d 268, 394 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1st Dep't 1977)
Jacob Stupler, an alleged indigent, was enrolled in the federal
Medicare program which reimbursed the petitioner, Peninsula Gen-
eral Nursing Home, for the cost of medical care and services ren-
dered to him.' When federal benefits were terminated, petitioner
promptly applied for Medicaid coverage on behalf of Mr. Stupler
pursuant to the New York State Medical Assistance for Needy Per-
sons Plan.' The Social Services Department of the City of New York
denied the application because Mr. Stupler had sold his house less
than one year before the date of his application for aid. Social Serv-
ices Law § 366(1)(e) provides that a transfer of property within one
year of the date of application for aid creates a presumption that
the transfer was for the purpose of qualifying for aid. This presump-
tion would render an applicant ineligible. 3
The nursing home, faced with the prospect of receiving no com-
pensation for the services it had already rendered to Mr. Stupler,
requested a hearing before the Department of Social Services to
challenge the denial of the aid application.4 The Department denied
this request, ruling that the Social Services Law allows only the
recipient of aid or his family to obtain review.' Petitioner instituted
the present suit to challenge the constitutionality of that Social
Services provision on the grounds that the state was taking away an
earned property right without a fair hearing. The nursing home
1. Peninsula General Nursing Home v. Sugarman, 57 App. Div. 2d 268, 394 N.Y.S.2d 644
(1st Dep't 1977).
2. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 363-69 et seq. (McKinney 1976).
3. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(1)(e) (McKinney 1976). The issue of whether the sale of
Mr. Stupler's home comes under the homestead exemption of the N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §
366(2)(a)(1) (McKinney 1976) was not considered by the appellate division, which decided
that the more important issue was the constitutionality of the rules governing hearings on
decisions made by the Social Services Department. 57 App. Div. 2d at 270, 394 N.Y.S.2d at
646.
4. 57 App. Div. 2d at 270, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 646. The family had originally requested a
hearing, which was scheduled by the Department of Social Services for Oct. 15, 1974, and
the nursing home knew this, but Mr. Stupler died in the interim and the hearing was can-
celled at the family's insistance. Mr. Stupler's estate also declined to pursue the matter.
5. Id.; N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366a(4) (McKinney 1976); 18 N.Y. CODES, RULES &
REGULATIONS 358.4 (1975).
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asked that it be paid with public funds for the services it rendered
to Mr. Stupler from the time of the exhaustion of Medicare benefits
until his death.6
The trial court ruled that Social Services Law section 366 and the
regulations thereunder do not afford the petitioner due process and
are therefore unconstitutional. It enjoined the Commissioner of So-
cial Services from enforcing the provisions of the statute without
giving the petitioner an opportunity for a hearing on the denial of
public assistance to its patient.7 The appellate division affirmed,
ruling that the petitioner should obtain the hearing it requested.'
The landmark case dealing with the right of public assistance
recipients to a fair hearing is Goldberg v. Kelly.' In Goldberg, New
York City residents who were participating in the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program brought suit to challenge the
procedure for notice and hearing in connection with the termination
of aid. The United States Supreme Court held that a pre-
termination evidentiary hearing was required when public assis-
tance payments were discontinued and that the procedure estab-
lished by the City of New York for dealing with such matters was
inadequate to meet the requirements of the Constitution.",
Goldberg clarified the interest which is vested in an individual
recipient of direct public assistance. However, the right of an insti-
tution, such as a nursing home, to appeal a decision directed against
one of its patients presents a more complicated question. The cru-
cial issue presented in the instant case was whether the petitioner
had an ascertainable property interest in the Medicaid reimburse-
ment payments, rather than just a mere expectation of receiving
such funds.
6. 57 App. Div. 2d at 270, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 646. Originally, the petitioner had instituted
an action pursuant to N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW & RULES Art. 78 (McKinney 1976), but the proper
use of an Article 78 proceeding is to review and correct the determination of a state, not to
attack the constitutionality of a statute. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & RULES § 103 (McKinney
1976); Battle v. Lavine, 37 N.Y.2d 742, 337 N.E.2d 132, 374 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1975); Gold v.
Lomenzo, 29 N.Y.2d 468, 280 N.E.2d 640, 329 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1972). The court did, however,
use its statutory discretion to treat the suit as one for declaratory judgment.
7. N.Y.L.J., June 5, 1975, p. 2, col. 6, at 16, col. 5.
8. 57 App. Div. 2d at 277, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 650-51.
9. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
10. Id. at 268. The New York procedure in question, which was set out in N.Y. Social
Welfare Law § 353(2) (McKinney 1966), had provided for a hearing after the termination of




Ross v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health1 is indicative of the courts'
concern to insure due process when a state makes a determination
which adversely affects the continued operation of a medical facil-
ity. In Ross, the State of Wisconsin determined that a nursing home
had failed to meet state regulations and was unfit to house Medicaid
patients. The state then attempted to remove the Medicaid patients
to a more suitable facility. The court observed that plaintiff nursing
home had a genuine property interest in retaining public assistance
patients and receiving public funds. It ruled that to the extent the
Wisconsin Health Law did not allow the nursing home a fair hear-
ing, it was unconstitutional."
Case v. Weinberger3 involved an attempt to enjoin the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare from removing a nursing home's
Medicare patients and relocating them in another facility. HEW
charged that the facility failed to meet the requirements of the Life
Safety Code. 4 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in weighing the
concern for the safety of the patients against the property interest
involved, held that at least a post-removal evidentiary hearing was
required."
In Coral Gables Convalescent Home v. Richadson," a Florida
nursing home challenged HEW's determination that for nearly two
years it received Medicare reimbursements to which it was not enti-
tled. The finding was made on the basis of an audit conducted by
Aetna Life & Casualty, HEW's fiscal intermediary between itself
and the medical facility. Aetna, on the authority of HEW, withheld
fifty percent of the payments due to the plaintiff for current Medi-
11. 369 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Wisc. 1973). Ross was certified as a class action and brought
by Regina Ross individually and in behalf of all other Wisconsin nursing homes similarly
situated, to challenge the validity of a statute and certain administrative rules of the Wiscon-
sin Department of Health.
12. Id. at 572.
13. 523 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1975).
14. The code is published by the National Fire Protection Association and is used to judge
the safety of nursing home facilities as mandated by Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §1396a(a)(28)(F)(i) (1970).
15. 523 F.2d at 609-11. HEW delegated its power to inspect the nursing home facilities to
the various social services agencies of the states. It should also be noted that the Regional
Directors of HEW can waive violations of the code if strict compliance with it would result
in unreasonable hardship to the nursing home, provided that such waiver would not adversely
affect the health and safety of the patients in the home. In Case, the possibility of a waiver
was denied.
16. 340 F. Supp. 646 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
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care services to set off and recoup the amounts allegedly overpaid.
Plaintiff's complaint stated that HEW did not give it the opportun-
ity for an administrative hearing. 7 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida found that the failure to afford
the plaintiff "at least a post-removal evidentiary hearing consti-
tuted a denial of due process,"'" and ruled that the "amounts which
have been deducted as offsets from current payments since Novem-
ber, 1970 have been unlawfully withheld."' 9 The Medicare Act nei-
ther required nor proscribed a hearing in such a situation, 0 but the
Coral Gables court concluded that where the exercise of a statutory
power adversely affects property rights, it should read the require-
ment of a fair hearing into the statute.
2
'
Two recent New York cases dealing with the New York Medical
Assistance for Needy Persons Plan agree in principle with the Coral
Gables holding. Birnbaum v. Whalen2 found that when confronted
with a rate audit challenge, a hearing is "a procedural safeguard of
a degree commensurate with the importance of petitioner's interest
affected by the respondents' actions. 23 Similarly, Briody v.
Whalen24 held that a retroactive determination that an institution
such as a nursing home is liable for a substantial sum of money
constitutes a "taking" in the constitutional sense and requires a due
process hearing. 5
17. Id. at 648.
18. Id. at 650.
19. Id,
20. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (1970), as amended (Supp. V 1975) incorporates the review
provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) which reads in pertinent part:
"findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals
who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be
reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided."
21. An interesting New York case which also stands for the proposition that a lack of
statutory language will not preclude a fair hearing is Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 468,
121 N.E.2d 421, 424 (1954).
22. 85 Misc. 2d 512, 380 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
23. Id. at 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 592-93. Previous decisions of the New York courts have
held that no property interest exists when a medical facility seeks to challenge prospective
Medicaid rates or future payments. See Sigety v. Ingraham, 29 N.Y. 2d 110, 272 N.E.2d 524,
324 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1971); White Plains Nursing Home v. Whalen, 53 App. Div. 2d 926, 385
N.Y.S.2d 392 (3rd Dep't 1976). Birnbaum is distinguished from these cases because it con-
cerned a rate audit which was retroactively applied creating a financial liability for the
plaintiff.
24. 89 Misc. 2d 296, 390 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
25. Id. at 298, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
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Howe Ave. Nursing Home, Inc. v. Nafus was the first case to
deal specifically with the constitutionality of Social Services Law
Section 366, the provision at issue in the Peninsula case. In Howe,
a nursing home sued a patient and the County of Westchester to
compel the county to pay the medical, hospital and nursing home
bills of the patient. The New York Supreme Court27 enjoined the
county from denying the patient medical assistance, and directed
the county to hold an administrative hearing with the nursing home
participating as a necessary party."8 The Appellate Division an-
nulled the injunction, but affirmed the fair hearing requirement:
[S]ection 366 of the Social Services Law, and the regulations adopted pur-
suant thereto, to the extent that they fail to furnish medical providers an
opportunity for a fair hearing (after county denial of eligibility), constitute a
denial of due process and violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and the corresponding provisions of the State Constitu-
tion ....
Peninsula relied on Howe in ruling that petitioner in the instant
dispute had been denied due process protections. 0 The Peninsula
court noted Howe's clear and definitive discussion of the inequities
of Social Services Law Section 366. The court agreed with Howe
that Section 366 completely ignored the rights of a provider of serv-
ices which participated in the public assistance program, and con-
cluded that the decision therein was a logical extension of the scope
of due process.'
In reaching the merits of the principal case,32 the Appellate Divi-
26. 54 App. Div. 2d 686, 387 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't 1976).
27. 85 Misc. 2d 196, 379 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
28. Id. at 198, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
29. 54 App. Div. 2d at 687, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 274. It is curious that though the court in
Howe made such a significant constitutional decision concerning the Social Services Law, it
did not concern itself with the nature of the hearing which it ordered to be held. It seemed
satisfied to rely on the idea that as long as some kind of hearing was held, then the interests
of all the parties would be afforded protection.
30. 57 App. Div. 2d at 272, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
31. Id. at 271-72, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
32. Id. at 270-71, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 646. The court decided to hear the case over the
objections of the respondents by ruling that although the law does not give the facility the
means to obtain an administrative review of a local agency determination, it nevertheless has
standing to request such a review.
The court did not consider the standing requirement at length but announced that it would
accept the broadening view of the standing requirement enunciated by the N.Y. Court of
Appeals in Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 364, 334 N.E.2d 579, 581, 372 N.Y.S. 2d
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sion observed that it must concentrate on the "nature" of the inter-
est at stake to determine petitioner's right to due process protec-
tions." It recognized the dilemma which faced the provider of serv-
ices. The appellate court noted that nursing home proprietors "have
a financial interest which obligates the State to pay for services
rendered to public assistance patients."34 The majority in Peninsula
believed that the true beneficiaries of the Social Services Law are
those with limited resources. Yet, this should not allow the Depart-
ment of Social Services to ignore the rights of the other parties
directly involved in the dispensing of public assistance to the
needy.35 By forbidding the provider of services to seek an adminis-
trative remedy, the Department of Social Services forces it to make
a difficult choice:
[A]n administrative adjudication of ineligibility ... foist[s] upon the
provider of services, assuming lack of cooperation by the patient or his family
for one reason or another, the choice, where feasible, of ceasing to provide
services or, in providing services, to undertake the burden of a lawsuit to
recover for same.3
The majority in Peninsula emphasized the statutory declaration
contained in Social Services Law Section 363, which it concluded
was a "declaration of objects" by the legislature.37 The section
states:
In carrying out this program every effort shall be made to promote maximum
public awareness of the availability of, and procedure for obtaining, such
623, 626 (1975), which ruled that denial of standing in such a situation would erect a barrier
against any judicial scrutiny of legislative action. The court in Peninsula believed that al-
though the nursing home was appealing a decision that affected a third party, this would not
be fatal to its standing. The court said that the injury was traceable directly to the regulations
of the agency involved and was not based on mere speculation. The petitioner was able to
demonstrate a sufficient, perceptable connection between the denial of Medicaid eligibility
and injury to its continued business operations. The nursing home and the patient had a
combined interest in seeing that the Medicaid assistance was available and thus put forth a
sufficient case or controversy to provide the necessary standing. See American Medical Ass'n
v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Il. 1977).
33. 57 App. Div. 2d at 274, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 648. Peninsula made this observation based
on the decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972), where the Supreme
Court elaborated on the necessary criteria involved in a due process problem.
34. 57 App. Div. 2d at 274, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 648.








The majority believed that this legislative scheme mandates the
cooperation of the Social Services Department and the provider of
services to see that the indigent patient is not denied adequate
medical care. Without this relationship, the court believed, the pro-
gram could not operate properly. Thus, each party involved has a
vital interest in promoting and safeguarding this cooperative ef-
fort. 39
The court found support for its interpretation in St. Clare's Hos-
pital v. Breslin,4 which had observed that the legislative purpose in
passing the Medical Services Plan was to insure treatment for those
who cannot afford it and to assure payment to the hospital provid-
ing such services if the patient is indigent." The Peninsula court
noted that "the achievement of this purpose" requires the coopera-
tion of all interested parties, including the provider of services.2
The Appellate Division concluded that a genuine property inter-
est was jeopardized in the instant case. Its rationale was that the
nursing home was not challenging prospective Medicaid rates or
payments to which it had only an expectancy interest; rather it was
seeking the proper compensation which it had earned once it ren-
dered services.43 The court believed that a medical facility is enti-
tled to the guarantee of due process when any genuine property
interest is affected by legislative action.44
Peninsula acknowledged Ross and Coral Gables as indicative of
a continued policy in both the state and federal courts to expand
fifth and fourteenth amendment protections. It also observed that
those decisions were meant to extend the fair hearing requirement
38. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 363 (McKinney 1976).
39. 57 App. Div. 2d at 275, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
40. 19 App. Div. 2d 922, 243 N.Y.S.2d 968 (3d Dep't 1963).
41. Id. at 923, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 970-71.
42. 57 App. Div. 2d at 275, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 649. The court believed that the providers of
services, because of the nature of their activities, are in the best position to furnish informa-
tion to applicants for public assistance and to help them in the application process.
43. Id. at 271, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
44. Id. at 277, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 650. It is pertinent to note the ruling of the United States
Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), that once a property interest is
recognized, "some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally deprived
of his property interests." Id. at 557-58.
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to situations where the slightest threat to property is involved.4" The
majority believed it appropriate to embrace this policy in deciding
the instant dispute. Thus, the court concluded that the Social Serv-
ices Law must be modified in order that adequate protection be
afforded to all those involved in the medical assistance program.4"
Judge Lane, dissenting in Peninsula, believed that the majority's
remedy was overly broad and unnecessary since the nursing home
had another remedy at law-a plenary suit against both the pa-
tient's estate and the Department of Social Services to recover the
value of the services rendered to the patient." Judge Lane main-
tained that so long as an administrative agency acts within reason-
able limits the courts are bound to give interpretations of such
agency great weight in their deliberations. He concluded that the
Department's finding of patient ineligibility was well within its pre-
rogative.11
The dissent also declared that the claim of the nursing home must
fail on its merits. It emphasized that a provider of services is enti-
tled to reimbursement only if goods or services are rendered to an
"eligible," as defined by the Social Services Law.49 If the patient
does not qualify, the facility's remedy is to seek reimbursement from
the patient himself. The relationship of the patient and nursing
home, the dissent stated, is akin to that which exists between a
"purchaser and seller."50 Judge Lane believed that the relief which
the petitioner should seek is not that which can be afforded
"through the medium of administrative review," but through the
proper avenue of a breach of contract suit.5'
Judge Lane maintained that the Peninsula Nursing Home was
not in the same position as the facilities in Ross and Coral Gables.
In those cases, the nursing homes were threatened with the removal
45. 57 App. Div. 2d at 272-75, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 647-48. For a good review of the history of
the fair hearing requirement see Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123- U. PA. L. REv. 1267
(1975).
46. 57 App. Div. 2d at 277, 394 N.Y.S.2d it 650.
47. 'Id. at 279-80, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 652 (Lane, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 279, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 652. See also Howard v. Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 271
N.E.2d 528, 530, 322 N.Y.S.2d 683, 686 (1971); Sigety v. Ingraham, 29 N.Y.2d 110, 114, 272
N.E.2d 524, 526, 324 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (1971).
49. N.Y.Soc. SERV. LAW § 366 (McKinney 1976).
50. 57 App. Div. 2d at 280-81, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 653 (Lane, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 280, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
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of a tangible benefit to which they were clearly entitled. They were
forced to rebut allegations with which they were intimately con-
cerned.2 This was not the situation in the instant case, because the
petitioner's right to compensation depended upon the eligibility of
the patient. In Judge Lane's opinion, Peninsula Nursing Home had
no more than a "'unilateral expectation' of a benefit which is not a
''53property interest protected by procedural due process ....
The reasoning of the dissent misses a vital point noted by the
majority.54 That is, once services have been rendered to public assis-
tance patients, a substantial interest in state reimbursement arises
since a nursing home cannot hope to remain financially sound with-
out these payments.5" Commenting on the dissent's point of view,
the majority stated:
To frustrate petitioner's claim to a fair hearing by the Department of Social
Services . . . is to exault form over substance and to render suspect the
balance of property interests and equities envisioned in the legislative enact-
ment to obtain requisite medical assistance for needy persons. 6
The difficulty with the dissent's suggestion that the medical prov-
ider bring a suit against the patient is that it can require an indigent
to bear the heavy burden of litigation when, through an administra-
tive error, he is judged ineligible for aid. The majority's desire to
resolve such disputes through an administrative review would seek
to prevent this occurrence.
Several New York courts have carefully scrutinized suits by medi-
cal providers to insure that indigents are not unjustly burdened. In
Knickerbocker Hospital v. Downing,57 a hospital brought suit
against the parents of a child to whom it had provided services.
When the child was admitted, the parents indicated that they pos-
sessed a certificate stating that the child was eligible for medical
assistance.58 However, when the hospital submitted its claim to the
52. Id.
53. Id. at 280, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
54. This observation was adopted by the Peninsula court from the concurring opinion of
Judge Reynolds in Ross v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health, 369 F. Supp. at 574.
55. 57 App. Div. 2d at 274, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 648. Interestingly, both the majority and the
dissent in Peninsula take note of the concurring opinion of Judge Reynolds in Ross. Each is
able to interpret material in that opinion as supporting its point of view.
56. Id. at 277, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
57. 65 Misc. 2d 278, 317 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Civ. Ct. 1970).
58. Id. at 279, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
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Department of Social Services, it was denied for reasons which were
never clearly defined.59 The Civil Court of New York County found
that the child was admitted to the hospital not on the credit of the
parents but "on the credit and responsibility of the Commissioner
of Social Services." 0 The court believed that the lawsuit was misdi-
rected and that the hospital should have proceeded against the
Commissioner.' Barring fraud or other irregularity, the existence of
the certificate demonstrated that the child was eligible for public
assistance. When the Department of Social Services denied aid to
the child without a proper explanation, it precipitated an inequit-
able result. In such a situation, the court explained, it is highly
probable that the supposed ineligible may be truly indigent." The
legislative pattern makes it clear that the hospital must look to the
Department of Social Services for payment, and not pursue poor
people for money they do not have.63 The Knickerbocker court con-
cluded that to hold otherwise would place "a burden on the indigent
recipient not contemplated by the statute."64
Similarly, Society of New York Hospital v. Blake" involved a
situation where the plaintiff hospital commenced a lawsuit to re-
cover the reasonable value of medical services rendered to the pa-
tient Charles Blake. The Department of Social Services, a third-
party defendant, had rejected the patient's application for public
assistance because the net income of his family exceeded the statu-
tory limit. In ruling against the Department's motion for summary
judgment, the court concluded that the Department's finding in
respect to Mr. Blake was erroneous. The court reasoned that Medi-
caid was designed to assist poor people of limited resources; and to
place the burden of litigation upon them, was much too harsh a
59. Id. The hospital bill was returned by the Social Services Department marked
"Disapproved Insurance." The court noted that no one had bothered to explain the meaning
of that term.
60. Id. at 280, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 690. The hospital had claimed that since the Department
of Social Services failed to honor its bill, then the defendant is liable based on the liability
of parents for necessities furnished to their infant children. The Knickerbocker court rejected
this reasoning. Id. at 279, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 689-90.
61. Id. at 280, 317 N.Y.S. 2d at 690.
62. Id. at 281, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 691.
63. Id. at 281, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
64. Id.
65. 73 Misc. 2d 305, 341 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Civ. Ct. 1973).
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procedure." It noted that in such a situation the dispute is not
simply between the Department and the patient, but "requires the
adjudication of the rights and responsibilities of the supplier of
medical services as well." 7 The court concluded by pointing out
that situation in Knickerbocker "would be true of many cases aris-
ing in this area." 8
It has been said that the provider of medical services as well as
the Department of Social Services has the obligation of helping
those in need of Medicaid assistance. 9 As such, it is difficult to
prove that the hospital or other medical services provider does not
have a sufficient interest to challenge a determination of the De-
partment which concerns the eligibility of one of its patients. If a
medical facility can be held responsible when it fails to enroll a
patient for Medicaid,7" then by analogy it should be given the right
to a fair hearing to challenge a determination of ineligibility. A
medical facility's interest in Medicaid reimbursement is an impor-
tant part of its continued operation and an interest which is akin
to a property right. As such, the problem gives rise to "interpreta-
tion of questions of constitutional dimensions . . . .""
The decision in Peninsula marks a continued expansion of the
meaning of due process and seeks to insure that all parties who are
directly involved in the dispensing of medical care to the needy are
protected.
Leonard J. Morreale, Jr.
66. Id. at 308, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 510.
67. Id. at 308, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
68. Id. For a further discussion of suits by medical providers against patients when public
assistance has been denied see Amsterdam Hosp. v. Cintron, 52 App. Div. 2d 404, 384
N.Y.S.2d 225 (3rd Dep't 1976) and Mt. Sinai Hosp. v. Kornegay, 75 Misc. 2d 302, 347
N.Y.S.2d 807 (Civ. Ct. 1973).
69. 75 Misc. 2d at 304, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 810. In Mt. Sinai, a hospital sued a mother for
the care it had rendered to her and to her newborn child. The defendant's mother had filled
out forms for public assistance at the hospital but they were not properly completed. The
hospital, however, ignored this fact and did not seek to correct the deficiencies on the applica-
tion. The court held that the hospital had a clear duty to ascertain and correct the difficulties
encountered here, and that it was negligent in not doing so. Because of this finding, the court
dismissed the suit against the defendant.
70. Id. at 305, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
71. 57 App. Div. 2d at 281, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
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